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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Dale Johnson (“Johnson” or “Plaintiff”) brings this 
untimely appeal of the district court’s dismissal with prejudice pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(1) of his negligence lawsuit against Defendant-Respondent Idaho Department 
of Labor (“the Department”), two administrative hearing officers, their supervisor, 
and a records custodian because of events that occurred during his first level 
unemployment benefits appeal, namely, the failure to create or maintain an audio 
recording of the hearing for his second level appeal.  This led to a remand order by 
the Idaho Industrial Commission (“the Commission”).  Plaintiff claims the two 
hearings and period of delay during remand caused him damages in the form of 
attorney fees incurred during the remand hearings.  Although, the Commission ruled 
in Johnson’s favor in its de novo review, which was not appealed by the Department, 
Johnson claims he is entitled to recover tort damages for the delay in his receipt of 
unemployment benefits, in addition to his alleged attorney fee damages.   
 Johnson also challenges on appeal the district court’s orders on various post-
judgment motions he filed in an attempt to overturn the Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal. His 
appeal from several of those orders, but not from the underlying order of dismissal 
and judgment, was timely. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
 Johnson filed his Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial on March 
20, 2017, in the First District Court in Bonner County, Idaho.  R., pp.14-20.  District 
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Judge Barbara A. Buchanan was assigned to the case.  R., p.14. 
 On June 21, 2017, the Department entered a special appearance and filed a 
motion to dismiss for insufficient process and insufficient service of process under 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(4) and (5). Augmented R., pp.1-3.  At the same time, the Department 
filed its Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  R., 
pp.21-22.   
 A motion to change venue was then filed by the Department on July 3, 2017.  
R., pp.39-42.   
 After a continuance requested by Johnson due to a family matter, R., pp.46-48, 
a hearing was held on September 6, 2017, on the Department’s motion to dismiss.  R., 
p.72 (court minutes). 
 On September 14, 2017, the district court filed its “Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Defendants’ I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss.”  R., pp.73-89. 
 That same day, September 14, 2017, judgment was entered against Johnson.  
R., pp.90-91. 
 Fourteen days later, September 28, 2017, Johnson filed a motion to reconsider 
pursuant to Rule 11.2(b) and a motion to allow additional discovery.  R., pp.100-103. 
 On November 8, 2017, a hearing was held on Johnson’s motions.  R., pp.238-
240 (court minutes). 
 On November 15, 2017, the district court entered its “Memorandum Decision 
and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motions for Reconsideration and to Allow Additional 
Discovery,” R., pp.248-252, along with its order denying the Department’s request for 
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attorney’s fees.  R., pp.241-247. 
 Fourteen days later, on November 29, 2017, Johnson filed a second set of post-
trial motions. See “Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Motion to Set Aside Judgment,” R., pp.253-256.   
 A hearing was held on Johnson’s second set of post-trial motions on January 
31, 2018.  R., pp.329-331 (court minutes). 
 On February 13, 2018, the district court entered its “Memorandum Decision & 
Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and to Set Aside Judgment.”  R., pp.332-339. 
 On March 21, 2018, the district court’s “Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Defendants’ Second Request for Attorney’s Fees” and “Judgment for 
Attorney’s Fees” were entered.  R., pp.370-373. 
 On March 23, 2018, Johnson filed a notice of appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court.  R., pp.374-78.  
C. Statement of the Facts 
 The case arises from unemployment benefits proceedings in the Appeals 
Bureau of the Department and subsequent appeals to the Commission. After an 
evidentiary hearing on August 5, 2015, before an administrative hearing officer in 
the Department’s Appeals Bureau, and an adverse decision, Johnson appealed to the 
Commission.  Shortly after the appeal was filed, it was discovered that a recording of 
the August 5, 2015, hearing could not be located.   
 On August 28, 2015, the Commission remanded the matter to the Appeals 
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Bureau so another hearing could be held.  Johnson did not file a motion with the 
Commission asking for reconsideration of its remand order, or for an order of the 
Commission allowing evidence to be taken before the Commission in lieu of a remand. 
 Two hearings on were held on remand before another administrative hearing 
officer, and testimony from various witnesses was taken.  Johnson was represented 
by counsel (the same counsel in the instant appeal) during both hearings. 
   On November 25, 2015, the second hearing officer entered another decision 
adverse to Johnson.  On December 9, 2015. Johnson appealed that decision to the 
Commission. 
 Thereafter, the Commission entered a decision finding Johnson eligible for 
unemployment benefits, which it reaffirmed on reconsideration. 
 There is no dispute that Plaintiff became aware that a transcript of his August 
5, 2015, hearing could not be located at some point before August 28, 2015, the date 
of the Commission’s remand order.  Complaint, ¶ 2.3, R., p.16.  Thus, any breach of a 
duty by Defendants necessarily would have occurred before August 28, 2015. 
 Johnson, because he was represented by undersigned counsel during the two 
hearings on remand, knew or reasonably should have known of the attorney fee 
damages he claims to have suffered during remand as a consequence of the alleged 
breach of duty.     
 As of November 25, 2015, when the second hearing officer’s decision was entered, 
the period of delay resulting from Defendants alleged negligence ended. Johnson has 
not pointed to any negligent acts that occurred after that date.   
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 Johnson’s negligence claim necessarily accrued on or before November 25, 2015.  
Johnson did not file a notice of tort claim within 180 days of that date, as required by 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”), I.C. §§ 6-901 et seq. 
 Johnson’s knowledge of his alleged attorney fee damages is confirmed by the 
notice of tort claim he tardily filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 25, 2016.  
The notice of tort claim described Johnson’s damages caused by the allegedly negligent 
handling of his appeal as follows: 
2. Description of Injury/Damage 
 Claimant has been forced to incur additional attorneys’ fees and 
costs in retaining counsel to represent him in the second and third 
hearings, which would not have been necessary but for the Department of 
Labor’s negligence.  Further, in the event that Claimant ultimately 
prevails if or when the Industrial Commission rules upon the Motions for 
Reconsideration, Claimant has suffered further damage in the delay in 
payment of benefits as a result of the necessity for a new hearing and 
subsequent appeal. 
R., p.37 (emphasis added).   
 The notice of tort claim also described the time and place of Johnson’s injury or 
damage: 
2. Time and Place Injury or Damage Occurred 
 It is unknown when the recording was lost.  The first hearing took 
place on August 5, 2015; the Department of Labor’s Custodian of Records 
informed Claimant of the loss of the recording via letter dated August 21, 
2015; and the remand was issued on August 28, 2015.  A second hearing 
was held October 22, 2015 and a third hearing was held on November 12, 
2015, the appeal was filed on December 9, 2015, and the decision from the 
Industrial Commission in Claimant’s favor was issued on April 29, [2016].  
The decision on the Motions for Reconsideration remains pending. 
R., pp.37-38. 
 Finally, when Johnson filed the notice of tort claim, he was able to more than 
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adequately describe the damages he was claiming, which included the attorney fees he 
incurred during the remand proceedings, notwithstanding that he was awaiting a 
decision by the Commission on the motion to reconsider filed by his employer and the 
Department:  
5. Amount of Damages Claimed 
 Attorney’s fees and costs incurred between the remand due to the 
loss of the recording and the filing of the Notice of Appeal following the 
second hearing are estimated to be approximately $5,000.  Delay in 
benefits is an amount to be determined, and missed mortgage payments, 
and other bill payments, as a result of the delay have resulted in increased 
interest and late fees in an amount to be determined. 
R., p.38. 
 It is important to note that the entirety of the period of delay would have ended 
on November 25, 2015, when the second hearing officer’s decision was entered. 
 On March 20, 2017, Johnson filed a “Complaint for Damages and Demand for 
Jury Trial” (“the Complaint”) on March 20, 2017, alleging that the Department and 
the other named Defendants were negligent in the handling of his first level appeal 
to the Department’s Appeals Bureau.  R., pp.14-20.  The Complaint alleges a single 
cause of action for negligence, and requests unspecified damages exceeding $10,000.  
Complaint, ¶ 2.9, R., p.18.  The Department’s allegedly negligent acts are described 
in Paragraph 2.7 of the Complaint: 
 The Department of Labor’s failure/neglect to preserve a recording 
of the August 5, 2015 hearing, the failure/neglect to issue necessary 
subpoenas [for that hearing] timely, the failure to produce a transcript, 
(and refusal to utilize Plaintiff’s available copy of audio and transcript) 
and resulting delay was a consequence of negligence by one or more 








ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did Johnson fail to timely appeal from the order granting the Department’s 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion and judgment, and from the order denying his first 
set of post-judgment motions, where his notice of appeal was filed more 
than 42 days after entry of those orders and judgment? 
II. Did the district court properly exercise its discretion in denying Johnson’s 
motions under I.R.C.P. 52, 59(e) and 60(b)(6), and in not allowing discovery 
where there was no genuine issue of material fact and Johnson advanced 
only speculation and conjecture in support of his motions? 
III. Did the district court properly exercise its discretion in denying Johnson’s 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss where there was no genuine dispute as 
to when Johnson first incurred his attorney fee damages and when he filed 
a Notice of Tort Claim with the Idaho Secretary of State? 
IV. Should this Court award the Department is costs and attorney fees 
pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-117(1) and 12-121 where Johnson has doggedly 










Because Johnson’s Second Set of Post-Trial Motions Did Not Terminate or Suspend 
the Time for Filing an Appeal, this Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Review the 
District Court’s Initial Order Dismissing this Action Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), or 
the Judgment Entered Thereon, or the District Court’s Order Denying Johnson’s 
First Set of Post-Trial Motions 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 Whether a notice of appeal has been timely filed is a question of law that an 
appellate court freely reviews. Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty’s Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 
147 Idaho 56, 58, 205 P.3d 1192, 1194 (2009). 
B. Johnson Filed a Timely Appeal from the District Court’s February 13, 2018, 
Order Denying His Second Set of Post-Judgment Motions  
 The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a sine qua non of appellate jurisdiction.  
A judgment or order that has not been timely appealed “must be automatically 
dismissed, either upon motion of a party or sua sponte action by the district court.” 
Smith v. Smith, 164 Idaho 46, 423 P.3d 998, 1004 (2018), quoting Vierstra v. Vierstra, 
153 Idaho 873, 877, 292 P.3d 264, 268 (2012); Goodman Oil Co., supra; accord, I.A.R. 
21. 
 An appeal from an appealable order or judgment of the district court “may be 
made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court 
within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court.”  
I.A.R. 14(a).   
 Johnson filed his notice of appeal with the district court clerk on March 23, 
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2018. R., pp.374-392.  This was within forty-two (42) days of the order entered on 
February 13, 2018, denying his second set of post-judgment motions. See 
“Memorandum Decision & Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Additional Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Set Aside Judgment,” R., pp.332-339.  Thus, 
Johnson timely appealed from the district court’s February 13, 2018, order.  
C. Johnson Failed to Timely Appeal from the District Court’s Initial Order 
Dismissing this Action Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and the Judgment, Both 
Entered on September 6, 2017, and from the District Court’s Order Filed 
November 15, 2017, Denying His First Set of Post-Judgment Motions 
 The notice of appeal Johnson filed on March 23, 2018, R., pp.374-392, was filed 
well beyond the forty-two (42) day jurisdictional period for filing an appeal from the 
following orders and judgment: 
• “Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants’ I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) 
Motion to Dismiss” filed September 14, 2017, R., pp.73-89; 
• “Judgment” entered September 14, 2017, R., pp. 90-91; and 
• “Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motions for 
Reconsideration and to Allow Additional Discovery” filed November 15, 2017, 
R., pp.248-252. 
It follows that unless Johnson can show that under Idaho law the time period for 
appealing from these orders and this judgment was somehow terminated or 
suspended, this Court has no jurisdiction to review them. 
 The gossamer thread upon which Johnson attempts to construct such an 
outcome is the “Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment” he filed on November 29, 2017.  R., pp.253-256.  
Because this motion containing his second set of post-trial motions, was filed within 
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14 days of the district court’s order denying his first set of post-trial motions, R., 
pp.248-252, Johnson tries in desperation to bootstrap his second set of motions to the 
first, even though his second set of post-trial motions was filed more than two months 
after entry of judgment.  R., pp.90-91, 253-256.   
 The analysis of the district court, which found Johnson’s argument to be 
unsupportable, is correct.  Johnson’s first round of post-trial motions captioned 
“Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Additional Discovery” did in fact 
terminate the period for filing an appeal.  Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) states in part: 
The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is 
terminated by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted, could affect 
any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in the action 
(except motions under Rule 60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or 
motions regarding costs or attorney’s fees) . . . . 
Johnson’s motion to reconsider sought an order from the court “pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2(b) RECONSIDERING its Order dismissing this matter.”  
R., p.101.  The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow such a motion if brought “within 
14 days after final judgment.”  I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1).   
 Because Johnson’s motion to reconsider was filed within 14 days of judgment 
and, if granted, could have affected the district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of 
law or judgment, it terminated the time for appeal under I.A.R. 14.  However, the 
motion to reconsider only terminated the time to appeal until November 15, 2017, the 
date that the district court denied the motion. R., pp.248-252.  As of that date, the 
time for Johnson to file an appeal from the judgment began to run anew.  I.A.R. 14(a) 
(where a motion terminates the time for an appeal, “the appeal period for all 
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judgments or orders commences to run upon the date of the clerk’s filing stamp on 
the order deciding such motion”). 
 Thus time period to appeal began running on November 15, 2017, and 14 days 
later, on November 29, 2017, Johnson filed a second set of post-trial motions.  See 
“Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment,” R., pp.253-256.  As with Johnson’s earlier motion to reconsider, the 
question then turns to whether this second set of post-trial motions terminated the 
appeal period.  This question depends on whether the motions filed on November 29, 
2017, were timely filed and were motions that “if granted, could affect any findings 
of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in the action.” I.A.R. 14(a).  
 The district court determined that Johnson’s Rule 52(b) motion for additional 
findings and fact and conclusions of law did not terminate the time for appeal because 
the motion was not timely filed.  A court “may amend its findings, or make additional 
findings, and may amend the judgment accordingly” pursuant to a Rule 52(b) motion, 
but only if the motion is “filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment.”  
I.R.C.P. 52(b) (emphasis added).  A motion must be timely filed to terminate the time 
for appeal.  Rule 14(a) states in part: 
The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is 
terminated by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted, could 
affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in the 
action. . . .  
 
(Emphasis added.)   
 The district court then properly denied Johnson’s motion to alter or amend its 
findings because Rule 52(a)(4) expressly states that a court is not required to make 
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findings or enter conclusions “when ruling . . . on a motion under Rule 12 or 56.”  
Thus, Johnson’s challenges to the adequacy of the court’s findings in ruling on the 
Department’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss and Johnson’s motion to allow 
discovery under Rule 56(d) were immaterial.   
 Johnson’s November 29, 2017, “Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment” also stated that it was being 
brought pursuant to Rule 60(b).  R., p.253.  Such a motion does not terminate the 
time for an appeal.  Rule 14(a), the rule providing for termination of the appeal time 
for certain “timely motion[s],” by its own terms does not apply to “motions under Rule 
60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.” 
 The district court then pointed out that, to the extent Johnson was attempting 
to terminate the time for appeal by casting his November 29, 2017, motion as a Rule 
59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment, see, e.g., R., p.282 (Johnson’s 
memorandum in support of additional findings), such a motion also would have been 
untimely.  Rule 59(e) states, “[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment must be filed 
and served no later than 14 days after entry of the judgment.”  That did not occur 
here. The motion was filed more than two months later. 
 Because the appeal clock began to run again on November 15, 2017, when the 
district court denied Johnson’s first round of post-trial motions. R., pp.248-252, the 
time for Johnson to appeal from the order granting the Department’s Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion and the judgment, and the district court’s order denying his first set of post-
trial motions, expired on December 27, 2017.  R., p.336.   
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 Johnson filed his notice of appeal to this Court on March 23, 2018.  R., pp.374-
78.   
 The only two orders of the district court that were entered within 42 days of 
the filing of Johnson’s notice of appeal these order, the only ones within the 
jurisdiction of the Court on appeal, are the district court’s “Memorandum Decision & 
Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and to Set Aside Judgment” filed on February 13, 2018, R., pp.332-339, and the 
district court’s “Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants’ Second 
Request for Attorney’s Fees” entered on March 21, 2018.  R., pp.370-373.  Through 
conscious choice or, perhaps, oversight, Johnson can no longer challenge the district 
court’s award of attorney fees to the Department because he did not raise the district 
court’s attorney fee order as an issue in his opening brief.   
 Thus, of the issues raised by Johnson on appeal in his opening brief, the only 
issues over which this Court has jurisdiction must relate solely to the district court’s 
denial of his November 29, 2017, “Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment.” R., pp.253-256.  Of course, 
this Court also has jurisdiction to review the issue whether the Department should 
be awarded its costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal.  The district court’s 
granting the Department attorney fees stated that Johnson’s second set of post-trial 
motions “were clearly untimely and had absolutely no merit,” and left the court with 
an “abiding belief” that they had been brought “frivolously, unreasonably, or without 






The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Johnson’s November 
29, 2017, Motions under Rules 52(a), 52(b), 59(e) and 60(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure 
 
A. Standards of Review 
 To the extent that Johnson raised below an I.R.C.P. 52(a) challenge to the 
district courts findings, which is disputed and would appear somewhat anomalous 
under the facts of this case, an appellate court will not reweigh the evidence or disturb 
the findings unless “clearly erroneous,” viz. unless they are not “supported by 
substantial and competent evidence.” Phillips v. Gomez, 162 Idaho 803, 806, 405 P.3d 
588, 591 (2017). 
The same standard of review applies to Rule 52(b) motions.  Johnson v. 
Edwards, 113 Idaho 660, 661–662, 747 P.2d 69, 70–71 (1987).  
 “[A] Rule 59(e) motion to amend a judgment is addressed to the discretion of 
the court. An order denying a motion made under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend a 
judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there has been a manifest 
abuse of discretion.” Pandrea v. Barrett, 160 Idaho 165, 171, 369 P.3d 943, 949 (2016), 
quoting Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344, 179 P.3d 303, 307 (2008), quoting 
Coeur d’Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 
P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). 
 A motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b) will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard.  “A district court does not abuse its discretion when it ‘(1) correctly 
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perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and 
applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise 
of reason.’’’ Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 914, 332 P.3d 815, 826 (2014), 
quoting O’Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 
(2008). 
B. The District Court Properly Denied Johnson’s Motions under Rule 52(a), Rule 
52(b) and Rule 59(e) 
 The district court properly Johnson’s motions under Rule 52(a),1 Rule 52(b) 
and Rule 59(e) for the reasons discussed supra.  
 Johnson’s Rule 52(b) and Rule 59(e) motions were not filed within 14 days of 
the judgment and, therefore, were untimely.  I.R.C.P. 52(b) (motion must be “filed no 
later than 14 days after the entry of judgment”); I.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) (“motion to alter 
or amend the judgment must be filed and served no later than 14 days after entry of 
the judgment”).   
 Johnson’s Rule 52(a) challenges to the adequacy of the court’s findings in ruling 
on the Department’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss and Johnson’s motion to allow 
discovery under Rule 56(d) were immaterial because the district court, in the first 
instance, was not required to make findings.  I.R.C.P. 52(a)(4) (court not required to 
make findings or enter conclusions “when ruling . . . on a motion under Rule 12 or 
                                            
1 The Department argued below, and continues to argue in this appeal that Johnson did not 
file a motion under Rule 52(a) because his motion expressly stated it was brought pursuant 
to Rule 52(b).  See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)(B) (motions must “state with particularity the grounds 
for the relief sought including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any”).  However, 




C. The District Court Properly Denied Johnson’s Rule 60(b)(6) Motion Because 
He Failed to Demonstrate Sufficient Grounds Under the Rule For Setting 
Aside the Judgment  
 Under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, “a court may relieve 
a party . . . from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . 
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.”  However, a Rule 60(b) motion “does not 
affect the judgment’s finality or suspend its operation.”   
 Johnson’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion was filed on November 29, 2017.  In ruling upon 
the motion, the district court noted that the Department had objected to the 
declaration of Rose Johnson because its averments were irrelevant, involved 
speculation and were not based upon personal knowledge.  The district court agreed.  
“Memorandum Decision & Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Additional Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Set Aside Judgment,” p.6, n.1, R., p.337.  The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so, or in denying Johnson’s request 
to present testimony.   
 The granting or denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is discretionary: 
A district court’s decision to grant or deny a I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion is 
within the district court’s discretion. Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 
149 Idaho 375, 380, 234 P.3d 699, 704 (2010). A district court does not 
abuse its discretion when it “(1) correctly perceives the issue as 
discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the 
correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise 
of reason.” O’Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 
P.3d 846, 851 (2008). 
Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho at 914, 332 P.3d at 827. 
 A Rule 60(b)(6) motion may not be granted unless “unique and compelling 
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circumstances” have been demonstrated: 
An aggrieved party may obtain relief from a final judgment by making 
a motion to the trial court under I.R.C.P. 60(b). Such a motion should 
not be used, however, as a substitute for a timely appeal. Johnston v. 
Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414, 420, 599 P.2d 985, 991 (1979) (citations omitted). 
For that reason, although the court is vested with broad discretion in 
determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion, its discretion 
is limited and may be granted only on a showing of “unique and 
compelling circumstances” justifying relief. Matter of Estate of Bagley, 
117 Idaho 1091, 1093, 793 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct.App.1990) (citing Puphal 
v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302, 669 P.2d 191 (1983)). 
Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 348–49, 924 P.2d 607, 610–11 (1996). 
 This Court has explained that, while Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall for the rule, it 
“was not intended to allow a court to reconsider the legal basis for its original 
decision” and that “[d]iscovery of new legal theories does not constitute grounds for 
bringing a 60(b) motion.” First Bank & Tr. of Idaho v. Parker Bros., 112 Idaho 30, 32, 
730 P.2d 950, 952 (1986). 
 In the case at bar, Johnson’s Rule 60(b)(6) was nothing more than a belated 
request for the district court to reconsider its original decision.  Johnson did not 
demonstrate “unique and compelling circumstances” that justified disturbing the 
finality of the district court’s judgment.   
 The district court carefully considered and then rejected all of Johnson’s 
specious arguments: 
 This Court recognizes that its determination of whether to grant 
or deny the plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion is discretionary; and in making 
its determination, the Court has considered the plaintiff’s motion, [and 
the memoranda and declarations filed in support], together with the oral 
argument of counsel . . . . 
19 
 
 Upon consideration thereof, this Court finds, first, that the Rule 
60(b)(6) motion is improper to the extent the plaintiff is trying to re-
litigate the substance of his negligence claim and challenge the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law made by this Court in its original [decision 
and order] . . . . 
 Second, the plaintiff has offered in support of his 60(b)(6) motion 
the mere speculation that the IDOL’s request for a $150 fee in order for 
the plaintiff “to obtain records and internal communications” as 
“possibly indicating the existence of many hundreds of pages of records 
that have not been disclosed in the course of” the plaintiff’s 
unemployment benefits proceedings.  Declaration of Dale Johnson, at ¶ 
1.  Mr. Johnson is speculating that the $150 fee is an “[e]xtraordinarily 
high cost for a response to my public records request, [and] further 
indicate[s] that there may [sic] significant relevant evidence that the 
Defendants are not disclosing in this case.”  Id. at ¶ 5.  This speculation 
by the plaintiff does not demonstrate “unique and compelling 
circumstances” required for this Court to set aside the Judgment 
pursuant to 60(b)(6).  The plaintiff’s issues with the IDOL and other 
state government agencies about public records are irrelevant to this 
case and a Rule 60(b) motion is not available as a remedy for disputes 
over public records requests. 
“Memorandum Decision & Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Additional Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Set Aside Judgment,” p.7, R.,p.338 (citing I.C. 
§ 74-115 as the “sole remedy” for someone aggrieved by the response to a public 
records request). 
 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s Rule 
60(b)(6) motion and its decision should be upheld. 
III. 
 
The District Court Properly Granted the Department’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to 
Dismiss Because Johnson Did Not Timely Present and File a Notice of Tort Claim 
With the Idaho Secretary of State as Required by the Idaho Tort Claims Act  
 
A. Standard of Review 
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 The district court reviewed Johnson’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion under the 
heightened standard applied to motions for summary judgment. Alpine Village Co. v. 
City of McCall, 154 Idaho 930, 934–35, 303 P.3d 617, 621–22 (2013), describes the 
standards of review as applied to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion that is treated as a motion 
for summary judgment: 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review 
for this Court is the same standard as that used by the district court in 
ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is appropriate if “the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the 
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Fuller v. 
Callister, 150 Idaho 848, 851, 252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011) (quoting 
Castorena v. Gen. Electric, 149 Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209, 213 (2010)). 
“However, the nonmoving party cannot rely on mere speculation, and a 
scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact.” Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 637, 
272 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2012). “The date when a cause of action accrues is 
a question of law to be determined by this Court where no disputed 
issues of material fact exist.” Harris v. State, ex rel. Kempthorne, 147 
Idaho 401, 405, 210 P.3d 86, 90 (2009). “This Court exercises free review 
over questions of law.” Fuller, 150 Idaho at 851, 252 P.3d at 1269. 
B. Johnson’s Failure to Timely File a Notice of Tort Claim Is a Proper Basis for 
Dismissing His Action Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) 
 A Rule 12(b)(1) motion “is rooted in the unique nature of the jurisdictional 
question.” Madsen v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 116 Idaho 758, 761, 779 P.2d 
433, 436 (Ct. App. 1989). A district court has “broader power to decide its own right 
to hear the case than it has when the merits of the case are reached.” Id. quoting 
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 
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(1981).  “Jurisdictional issues, whether they involve questions of law or of fact, are 
for the court to decide.” Id. (citing same).  “Moreover, because jurisdiction is a 
threshold question, judicial economy demands that the issue be decided at the outset 
rather than deferring it until trial, as would occur with denial of a summary judgment 
motion.” Id. (citing same). 
 The timely filing of a notice of tort claim under the ITCA is similar in many 
respects to the administrative exhaustion requirement in other contexts such as the 
Idaho Human Rights Act. I.C. §§ 67-5901 et seq.  Whether or not the timely filing of 
a notice of tort claim is labeled as “jurisdictional,” it cannot be reasonably disputed 
that the legislature intended the timely filing of a notice of tort claim as a condition 
precedent to filing of a negligence lawsuit against the State.  The words of Idaho Code 
§ 6-908 are clear: 
No claim or action shall be allowed against a governmental entity or its 
employee unless the claim has been presented and filed within the time 
limits prescribed by this act. 
 Idaho courts have consistently interpreted the language of I.C. § 6–908 to mean 
that compliance with the notice requirement of the ITCA is a mandatory and must 
occur before suit can be filed.   Madsen v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, supra, 
citing McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987); Overman v. 
Klein, 103 Idaho 795, 654 P.2d 888 (1982); Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 
P.2d 1062 (1978); Independent School Dist. of Boise v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 
987 (1975).    
 The question whether a claim has been timely presented and filed is a question 
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of law that goes to the heart of the legal right of a plaintiff bring an action against 
the state. Therefore, this issue is appropriate for disposition under Rule 12(b)(1). 
C. Johnson Failed to Comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Specifically Idaho 
Code § 6-905; Because of This, His Complaint Was Properly Dismissed 
 Under Idaho Code § 6-905, all tort claims against the State that fall within the 
ITCA must be presented to and filed with the Idaho Secretary of State within 180 
days from the date the claim “arose or reasonably should have been discovered.”  
Section 6-905 reads: 
All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this act and 
all claims against an employee of the state for any act or omission of the 
employee within the course or scope of his employment shall be 
presented to and filed with the secretary of state within one hundred 
eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have 
been discovered, whichever is later. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 The State is defined as “the state of Idaho or any office, department, agency, 
authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university or other 
instrumentality thereof.”  Idaho Code § 6-902(1) (emphasis added).  Because the 
Department is a department of the State, it falls within the purview of the ITCA.  
 The purposes of the notice of claim requirement under the ITCA are to: (1) save 
needless expense and litigation by providing opportunity for amicable resolution of 
differences among parties; (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into 
the cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the state’s liability, if any; 
and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses.  Driggers v. Grafe, 148 Idaho 295, 297, 
221 P.3d 521, 523 (Ct. App. 2009); citing Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426–27, 
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816 P.2d 982, 983–84 (1991). 
 The language in Idaho Code § 6-905 is mandatory. When it is read together 
with Idaho Code § 6-908, it is apparent, and the Court has held that the failure to 
comply with the notice requirement bars a suit, regardless of how legitimate its 
underlying claim might be.  Driggers, 148 Idaho at 297, 221 P.3d at 523; see also Avila 
v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 748, 890 P.2d 331, 334 (1995). 
 Johnson’s negligence claim “arose or reasonably should have been discovered,” 
I.C. § 6-905, on or before the date of the second Appeals Examiner’s decision, 
November 25, 2015.  On that date, he was fully aware of the Department’s alleged 
negligence – the missing transcript and all of the other facts relating to supposed 
improprieties occurring during the Appeals Examiner proceedings.  Johnson also was 
aware of, “or reasonably should have discovered,” on or before that date the attorney 
fees he incurred during the two hearings on remand that occurred because of the 
alleged negligence.  The district court found that the period of delay resulting from 
the lost recording of the August 5, 2015, “was from August 5th to November 25, 2015, 
when the second Appeals Bureau decision was issued.”  “Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss,” R. p.85. Johnson’s 
cause of action accrued on or before November 25, 2015.  Johnson admitted as much 
in his memorandum supporting reconsideration when his counsel wrote to the court: 
“at the time of the second unfavorable decision [November 25, 2015], the only damages 
which Mr. Johnson could determine with any degree of certainty were attorneys’ fees 
and costs.”  R., p.168 (emphasis added) 
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 It is undisputed that Johnson’s Notice of Tort Claim was presented more than 
180 days after November 25, 2015.  Therefore, Johnson failed to timely file his Notice 
of Tort Claim.   
 Accordingly, the district court’s order granting the Department’s Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion to dismiss should be affirmed.  
D. Johnson’s Argument That His Cause of Action Did Not Accrue Until He 
Learned of the Industrial Commission’s Decision on the Unemployment 
Benefits Appeal Is Supported By Neither Fact Nor Law 
 Johnson states that because he did not know the full extent of his damages, 
his cause of action did not accrue on November 25, 2015.  This position is supported 
by neither fact nor law.  
 In the analogous area of statutes of limitation, Idaho cases hold that the clock 
starts to run on filing a claim when “some damage” has occurred.  Stephens v. Stearns, 
106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984), quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law 
of Torts § 30 (4th ed. 1971). 
 On or before November 25, 2015, Johnson knew of the actions of the 
Department that he alleges were negligent, and he also had actual knowledge of 
“some damage” – the attorney fees he incurred during the second Appeals Examiner 
proceedings.  The fact that he believed that he might incur additional damages 
occurring thereafter is of no moment.  This point was made clear in Ralphs v. City of 
Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 227-28, 560 P.2d 1315, 1317-18 (1977), where the Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected a similar argument: 
Here, it is clear that on the date of the incident plaintiff Ralphs was 
aware that he had been attacked, assaulted and battered, that the Chief 
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of Police was allegedly negligent in permitting the attack and that the 
city of Spirit Lake was negligent in employing a man of Newton’s alleged 
characteristics and in failing to discharge him. The fact that plaintiff 
Ralphs became at a later time aware of additional injuries or damages 
is not sufficient to excuse his earlier knowledge of the alleged wrongful 
act of the physical assault upon him caused by the then existing alleged 
negligence of Newton and the city of Spirit Lake. 
Id.  
 The period of delay caused by the alleged negligence of Defendants was finite: 
it had a beginning and end.  That end was November 25, 2015.  Thus, any cases 
involving a “continuing tort,” e.g., Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 604, 850 P.2d 749, 
755 (1993), are inapposite.  See Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 463-64, 210 P.3d 
563, 571-72 (Ct.App. 2009).  
 Any allegedly negligent conduct by the Defendants ceased on November 25, 
2015.  That fact cannot be denied and has not been controverted.  There was no 
tortious conduct that continued thereafter, and Johnson himself admits that he 
suffered “some damage” by that date.  This is not a continuing tort case.  
E. Johnson’s Emails and/or Letters Complaining About Department Employees 
Were Not Notices of a Tort Claim 
 Johnson attempts to avoid the inevitable result of his untimely filing of a 
Notice of Tort Claim by arguing that various emails and/or letters should suffice as a 
notices of tort claims, namely an email to Appeals Bureau administrator Amy 
Hohnstein, a letter to a deputy attorney general assigned to the Department, and a 
constituent grievance he sent to Idaho’s Governor and the Director of the Department 
on December 6, 2015. After the district court’s decision dismissing Johnson’s 
Complaint, Johnson or his wife communicated with various state offices.  From what 
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is essentially an internal note to file entered by a constituent services individual at 
the Governor’s office, Johnson asserts that his constituent complaint should have the 
legal force of a notice of tort claim. 
 There are a number of glaring and fatal defects with this argument.  First, the 
staff member’s note to file dated February 15, 2016, said only “Case is in litigation.  
Will close.”  This note simply reflected that Johnson’s grievance was indeed in 
litigation before the Commission on Johnson’s appeal from the Appeals Examiner’s 
decision.  Reason and common sense do not support conflating a note to file such as 
this with the presentment of a tort claim notice to the Idaho Secretary of State’s 
Office.  To do so would be contrary to the purposes of the ITCA.  Second, Johnson’s 
December 6, 2015, grievance letter to the governor and the director fails to meet the 
statutory requirements of a notice of tort claim; it does not even come close.  It 
contains no claim for a specific amount of damages and omits most of the other 
elements required by statute.  I.C. § 6-907.  Third, Johnson advances no law 
supporting the novel assertion that an office of state government or the director of a 
state agency has a duty to forward constituent letters – or even bona fide notices of 
tort claim – to the Idaho Secretary of State’s Office, or for the even more radical and 
preposterous suggestion that a deputy attorney general has an obligation to assist an 
individual in perfecting a negligence claim against a state agency that is his client.  
 Finally, the most important uncontroverted fact is that the Idaho Secretary of 
State’s Office never received any letter or other document relating to this matter until 
August 25, 2016, when it received Johnson’s Notice of Tort Claim.  No matter how 
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much supposition and conjecture Johnson can attempt to muster about state 
employees of the Department, the governor’s office, and elsewhere, or about who did 
what with the documents he sent complaining about the handling of his 
unemployment benefits matter, only the Idaho Secretary of State’s Office matters, 
because that is where the ITCA mandates tort claim notices to be presented.   
 The Third Declaration of Lisa Mason renders irrelevant and immaterial all of 
Johnson’s supposition and conjecture because she states under penalty of perjury that 
nothing was received by the Idaho Secretary of State’s Office relating to this case 
prior to August 25, 2016.  Her declaration states: 
 3. On June 16, 2017, September 1, 2017, and again today I 
reviewed the files of the Secretary of State’s Office and searched for any 
records or documents relating to: (a) the Notice of Tort Claim that was 
filed with the Secretary of State’s Office on August 25, 2016, by Dale 
Johnson and his attorney James McMillan alleging negligence on the 
part of the State of Idaho (“the Notice of Tort Claim”); (b) the lawsuit of 
Dale Johnson v. State of Idaho, Department of Labor, et al., filed in the 
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bonner County Case No. 
CV-17-423 (“the Lawsuit”); and (c) the letter dated December 6, 2015, 
from Dale Johnson addressed to: “State of Idaho; Public Officers of 
Accountability Butch Otter; Gov and Ken Edmunds; Gov Appointed the 
Department” which letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A (“Exhibit A”).   
(A copy of the Notice of Tort Claim is attached to my initial declaration 
herein.) 
 4. The Secretary of State’s Office did not receive any 
documents relating to the Notice of Tort Claim, or have actual or 
constructive knowledge of any of the events described therein, prior to 
the presentment of the Notice of Tort Claim to it on August 25, 2016.  
On October 4, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Doug Werth forwarded to 
me a copy of the [Second] Declaration of Dale Johnson dated September 
28, 2017, which had attached to it a copy of a letter dated December 6, 
2015, from Dale Johnson addressed to: “State of Idaho; Public Officers 
of Accountability Butch Otter; Gov and Ken Edmunds; Gov Appointed 
the Department” (“Exhibit A”).   
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 5. I have searched the records of the Secretary of State’s 
Office and prior to October 4, 2017, the office had not received Exhibit A 
or any copy thereof, in whole or in part; and prior to the presentment to 
the Secretary of State’s Office on August 25, 2016 of the Notice of Tort 
Claim, the Secretary of State’s Office had not received any letter or 
documentation of any kind relating to, or describing any of the events 
within, the Notice of Tort Claim. 
 6. The first document or other record of any kind received by 
the Secretary of State’s Office relating to the events described in the 
Notice of Tort Claim was the Notice of Tort Claim itself, which was 
received by the Secretary of State’s Office on August 25, 2016. 
Declaration of Lisa Mason, pp.2-3, R., pp.129-131. 
 A party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of that party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial.” I.R.C.P. 56(c).  Further, summary judgment proceedings are decided based on 
admissible evidence, Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 54, 383 P.3d 1220, 1224 
(2016), not supposition and conjecture. 
 There is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the facts recited under oath 
in Lisa Mason’s declarations.  There is no genuine issue of material fact as to the date 
that Johnson first filed his Notice of Tort Claim with the Idaho Secretary of State.  It 
was filed on August 25, 2016.  This presentment and filing was untimely.  Consequently, 
the district court properly granted the Department’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion and properly 
denied Johnson’s motion for reconsideration and request for discovery.  
The presentment issue in this appeal is guided by CNW, LLC v. New Sweden 
Irrigation District, 161 Idaho 89, 383 P.3d 1259 (2016), where this Court held that 
“the presentment requirement . . . is satisfied when the notice of tort claim is 
29 
 
delivered to an employee or agent of the governmental entity who then delivers the 
notice to the clerk or secretary.”  (Emphasis added.)  Here, the two letters attached to 
Johnson’s declaration, and the letter to the Governor and the director were not 
delivered to the Idaho Secretary of State within the 180 day period. 
 It should be noted that the standards for reviewing Johnson’s first motion to 
reconsider are the same as those applied in reviewing the district court’s decision 
dismissing his case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).  In his motion to reconsider, Johnson 
failed to present any new facts or legal arguments calling into question the district 
court’s accurate legal analysis of this case.   
 Johnson also asserted below that he “requires an opportunity to conduct 
additional discovery in order to determine the existence and handling of this [third] 
letter, and other documents submitted to the State.”  Motion for Reconsideration, p.2, 
¶ 2, R., p.101.  The threshold question relating to the third letter and any other 
document is whether the Idaho Secretary of State received any such letter or 
document within the 180 day presentment period.  Obviously, Johnson was in 
possession of all the information he needed to make an averment concerning all 
documents he sent to government employees and officials since, after all, he was the 
one who would have sent them.  Moreover, what documents the Department received 
and when they were received was beside the point; what matters was the date of 
receipt of any documents by the Idaho Secretary of State.  The Third Declaration of 
Lisa Mason answers the relevant inquiry and no amount of discovery by Johnson is 
going to change that.  She declared under penalty of perjury that the Idaho Secretary 
30 
 
of State received no such documents within the relevant time period.  That fact is 
uncontroverted.  So Johnson could show he sent 100 letters to the Department and, 
even then, those letters would be irrelevant because none of them found their way to 
the Idaho Secretary of State within the time frame required by the ITCA. 
 Johnson also asserted in his motion to reconsider, without substantiation or 
specificity that his damages were “ongoing and continuous” and that his negligence 
claim “did not accrue until the issuance of the Industrial Commission’s decision which 
brought the matter to a close.”  Motion for Reconsideration, p.3, ¶ 4, R., p.102.  
Johnson cited no materials to support his naked damages assertion.  I.R.C.P. 56(c)(3).  
Again, Johnson did not need discovery to determine the extent of his alleged damages.  
It is undisputed that: (1) if a tort occurred, it occurred when the Industrial 
Commission remanded Johnson’s matter for further proceedings before an Appeals 
Examiner; and (2) all the facts necessary to argue duty, breach, proximate cause and 
damages were known, or reasonably knowable, to Johnson when he filed his second 
appeal to the Industrial Commission.  
 Johnson also suggested below, again, without any substantiation or 
explanation other than a nebulous suggestion of possible spoliation, that he “believes 
further clarification and discussion with regard to presentment and continuing tort 
issues, [as] well as the inclusion of [unspecified] additional information and 
documents from the underlying Department of Labor and Industrial Commission 
cases, could prove instructive to the Court herein.”  Motion for Reconsideration, p.2, ¶ 
3, R., p.101 (emphasis added).  A motion for reconsideration must do more than 
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simply suggest that there may be additional information that “could prove 
instructive.”   
 In the case of Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 
294 P.3d 1111 (2012), this Court explained and re-affirmed its prior reasoning in 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 223, 108 P.3d 380 (2005), as follows: 
 In Jenkins, the plaintiff requested additional time to respond to a 
motion for summary judgment because the case was complex and there 
were outstanding requests for written discovery and depositions. Id. at 
238, 108 P.3d at 385. In the supporting affidavit, the plaintiff’s attorney 
stated that “he believed the discovery would produce additional 
documents and testimony supporting the Jenkins’ theories, and that he 
required the opportunity to use the responses and testimony in 
additional discovery in order to thoroughly respond to summary 
judgment.” Id. This Court held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion because “the affidavit ... did not specify 
what discovery was needed” to properly respond to the summary 
judgment motion, “and did not set forth how the evidence he expected to 
gather through further discovery would be relevant to preclude 
summary judgment.” Id. at 239, 108 P.3d at 386. Similarly, in Taylor v. 
AIA Services Corporation, the district court denied a plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) 
motion for additional time to conduct discovery. 151 Idaho 552, 572, 261 
P.3d 829, 849 (2011). The court ruled that the plaintiff had more than a 
year to conduct discovery and that the motion did not set forth what 
relevant information the plaintiff needed or provide a “reasonable basis 
to believe additional discovery will produce new or relevant information 
not previously disclosed....” Id. This Court affirmed the district court’s 
decision, noting that the plaintiff had failed to rebut “the district court’s 
finding that he failed to point to any information or document that may 
be relevant to” his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. 
Boise Mode, LLC, supra, 154 Idaho at 104–05, 294 P.3d at 1116–17.  See also I.R.C.P. 
56(d) (requiring a nonmovant to show “by affidavit or declaration that, for specified 
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition”) (emphasis added). 
The cases of Jenkins and Boise Mode, LLC and I.R.C.P. 56(d) all support the district 
court’s denial of Johnson’s motion to reconsider. 
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 Finally, Johnson in his motion for reconsideration stated that he “believes that 
the issues concerning possible spoliation of evidence on the part of the Defendants 
warrant further discussion.”  Motion for Reconsideration, p.2, ¶ 3, R., p.101.  Again, 
like the averments described above, this was pure supposition unsupported by 
anything of substance.  Johnson was in the exact same position as the nonmoving 
party in Jenkins who merely “believed the discovery would produce additional 
documents and testimony supporting the Jenkins’ theories, and that he required the 
opportunity to use the responses and testimony in additional discovery in order to 
thoroughly respond to summary judgment.”   
 Following the reasoning of Jenkins and Boise Mode, LLC, it is respectfully 
submitted that the district court properly exercised its discretion and denied 




This Court Should Award the Idaho Department of Labor its Attorney  
Fees and Costs on Appeal Pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-117(1) and 12-121 
  
 Idaho Code § 12-117(1) provides as follows: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, 
the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the 
proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney’s fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, 
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law. 
A court may award a prevailing party attorney fees if provided for by any 
statute or contract.  I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).  The determination of the prevailing party is 
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within the court’s discretion, and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Syringa 
Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep’t of Admin., 159 Idaho 813, 830, 367 P.3d 208, 225 (2016) 
(Syringa II) (quoting Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SE/Z Const., LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 
49, 294 P.3d 171, 175 (2012)).   
 An award to the Department of its attorney fees in this appeal under Idaho 
Code § 12-117 is appropriate because of Johnson’s complete disregard of the plain and 
unambiguous text of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  The reasons set forth in the 
district court’s order granting attorney fees apply with equal force on appeal.  There 
was no good faith argument by Johnson for a modification of existing law; rather, 
Johnson simply disregarded the plain text of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  
 Two recent cases from this Court support an award of attorney fees under 
Idaho Code § 12-117.  In Jayo Development, Inc. v. Ada County Board of Equalization, 
158 Idaho 148, 345 P.3d 207 (2015), the legal dispute focused on the application of a 
property tax exemption provided by Idaho law.  The Idaho Supreme Court held that 
the plain, unambiguous language of the statute did not entitle the appellant to the 
property tax exemption.  Id., 158 Idaho at 153, 345 P.3d at 212.  This was contrary to 
the appellant’s argument that it qualified under the plain language of the exemption.  
Id., 158 Idaho at 151, 345 P.3d at 210.  In addressing the respondent’s request for 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117, this Court held that the appellant pursued 
the appeal unreasonably.  Id., 158 Idaho at 154, 345 P.3d at 213.  It explained that 
“[i]n instances where parties to appeals before this Court have advanced arguments 
based upon a disregard for plain language, we have found them to have acted without 
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a reasonable basis in law.”  Id. citing Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 154 
Idaho 716, 724, 302 P.3d 341, 349 (2012); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 
356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005). 
 Similarly in Arnold v. City of Stanley, 158 Idaho 218, 345 P.3d 1008 (2015), the 
Arnolds filed suit under the Open Meetings Law’s private right of action for “[a]ny 
person affected by a violation of” the Open Meetings Law.  Arnold, 158 Idaho at 220, 
345 P.3d at 1010.  The Idaho Supreme Court, agreeing with the district court, held 
that the Arnolds lacked standing to challenge a violation of the Open Meetings Law 
under the plain, unambiguous language of the statute creating a cause of action.  Id., 
158 Idaho at 223, 345 P.3d at 1013.  The Court then turned to the city’s request for 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117.  The Idaho Supreme Court explained that 
it did not typically award attorney fees in matters of first impression, but also related 
that “the purpose of I.C. § 12-117 is to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary 
action and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified 
financial burdens defending against groundless charges.”  Id., 158 Idaho at 224, 345 
P.3d at 1014 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted).  The 
Court acknowledged the theory advanced by the Arnolds, and indicated that they 
may have reasonably pursued this theory in the district court, but they did not 
reasonably pursue it in the Idaho Supreme Court.  Id.  The plain language of the 
statute was “clear enough that [the Court] believe[d] the Arnolds’ appeal was made 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law.”  Id.  As the Court remarked, “[a]sserting 
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that an appeal involves a matter of first impression is not a ‘free pass’ to bring an 
appeal based on unreasonable arguments.”  Id.  
 Jayo Development and Arnold support an award of attorney fees on appeal.  
Johnson throughout this litigation and on appeal has acted without a reasonable 
basis in law or fact.   
 Another basis for awarding attorney fees or appeal to the Department is Idaho 
Code § 12-121. As of March 1, 2017, Idaho Code § 12-121 provides that in any civil 
action, “the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party or 
parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued, or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”  2017 Idaho Sess. Laws. Ch. 47; see 
also Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 883, 380 P.3d 681, 696 (2016) (seemingly 
recognizing that whatever law was in effect as of March 1, 2017, as to Idaho Code § 
12-121 would apply to all cases that had not become final as of that date).  Under this 
standard, the Court looks at “whether the losing party’s position is so plainly 
fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”  Doble v. 
Interstate Amusements, Inc., 160 Idaho 307, 308-09, 372 P.3d 362, 363-64 (2016) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 For purposes of Idaho Code § 12-121, the Department is a party.  Johnson, as 
discussed above, had no reasonable basis in law or fact for bringing this appeal.   
The Department should be awarded its reasonable attorney fees under Idaho 





 Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that the decisions of the 
district court be affirmed, and that this Court enter its order awarding the 
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